Institutional transformation and system change: changes in corporate governance of German corporations by Lane, Christel
www.ssoar.info
Institutional transformation and system change:
changes in corporate governance of German
corporations
Lane, Christel
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Lane, C. (2004). Institutional transformation and system change: changes in corporate governance of German
corporations. (Reihe Soziologie / Institut für Höhere Studien, Abt. Soziologie, 65). Wien: Institut für Höhere Studien
(IHS), Wien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-220637
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  
Institutional Transformation 
and System Change: 
Changes in Corporate 
Governance of German 
Corporations 
Christel Lane  
65 
Reihe Soziologie 
Sociological Series 
  
  
 
 
 
65
Reihe Soziologie
Sociological Series 
Institutional Transformation 
and System Change: 
Changes in Corporate 
Governance of German 
Corporations 
Christel Lane 
 
June 2004 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna 
  
 
Contact: 
 
Michael Jonas 
(: +43/1/599 91-212 
email: jonas@ihs.ac.at 
 
Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the 
economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Education, and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the 
first institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in 
Austria. The Sociological Series presents research done at the Department of Sociology and aims to 
share “work in progress” in a timely way before formal publication. As usual, authors bear full 
responsibility for the content of their contributions.  
 
 
Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) wurde im Jahr 1963 von zwei prominenten Exilösterreichern –
dem Soziologen Paul F. Lazarsfeld und dem Ökonomen Oskar Morgenstern – mit Hilfe der Ford-
Stiftung, des Österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und der Stadt Wien gegründet und ist 
somit die erste nachuniversitäre Lehr- und Forschungsstätte für die Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
wissenschaften in Österreich. Die Reihe Soziologie bietet Einblick in die Forschungsarbeit der 
Abteilung für Soziologie und verfolgt das Ziel, abteilungsinterne Diskussionsbeiträge einer breiteren 
fachinternen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche Verantwortung für die veröffentlichten 
Beiträge liegt bei den Autoren und Autorinnen. 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the many changes which have transformed the German system of 
corporate governance during the last seven odd years. It concludes that it is in the process 
of converging towards the Anglo-American model and that this has fundamentally affected 
the way strategic decisions are made in firms. Convergence is not seen as a functional 
necessity, nor is it viewed as inevitable. 
The transformation in capital markets and the rise to dominance of the notion of shareholder 
value is particularly affecting large international and quoted firms but is gradually spreading 
also to other parts of the economy. This transformation is affecting labour and industrial 
relations in negative ways, as well as posing a threat to the German production model of 
diversified quality production. 
The paper offers both a theoretical exploration of institutional and system transformation and 
an empirical study which substantiates the theoretical position taken with evidence about 
recent trends in capital markets, banks, government and firms. Evidence from the 
pharmaceutical/chemical industry is supplemented by data on firms in other sectors, 
including the financial sector.  
The theoretical examination of institutional change focuses on the notions of system logic, 
institutional complementarity, functional conversion and hybridisation. It examines both 
external sources of change and internal powerful actors who promote the process of 
transformation. The notions of hybridisation of the German business system, as well as 
claims about functional conversion and the evolution of a new complementarity, are rejected 
in favour of a trend towards convergence.  
Zusammenfassung 
Im Zentrum der Abhandlung stehen Veränderungsprozesse, die das deutsche System der 
Corporate Governance in den vergangenen sieben Jahre transformiert haben. Es wird 
argumentiert, dass es sich in einem Prozess der Anpassung an das anglo-amerikanische 
System befindet und dass dieser Wandel die Wege strategischer Entscheidungsfindung in 
privatwirtschaftlichen Unternehmen fundamental beeinflusst.  
Die Veränderungen der Kapitalmärkte und die Durchsetzung des Shareholder-Value-Prinzips 
beeinflussen nicht nur große internationale Unternehmen, sondern greifen auch auf andere 
Teile der Wirtschaft durch. Diese Transformationen wirken sich sowohl auf der Ebene der 
Arbeitsbeziehungen als auch auf der Ebene der industriellen Beziehungen negativ aus und 
bedrohen das deutsche Modell diversifizierter und qualitativ hochwertiger Produktion. 
Derzeitige Veränderungsprozesse in den Kapitalmärkten, den Banken, den Governance-
Systemen und den Unternehmen werden sowohl mit Hilfe eines theoretischen 
 Erklärungskonzeptes institutioneller und systemischer Transformation als auch mit Hilfe 
einer empirischen Rückbindung des Konzeptes analysiert. Die im Vordergrund stehenden 
Ausführungen über Entwicklungstrends in der chemisch-pharmazeutischen Industrie werden 
mit Daten aus Unternehmen anderer Sektoren sowie aus dem Finanzsektor angereichert.  
Das theoretische Konzept institutionellen Wandels zielt auf die Erklärung der Systemlogik, 
der institutionellen Komplementarität, sowie der funktionalen Konversion und Hybridisierung 
ab. Hierbei werden sowohl systemexterne Wandlungsfaktoren als auch systeminterne 
handlungsmächtige Akteure berücksichtigt, die den Transformationsprozess voran treiben. 
Wie heraus gearbeitet wird, lässt sich der beobachtete Wandel weder mit dem Verweis auf 
die Bedeutung der Hybridisierung des Unternehmenssystems noch mit dem Verweis auf 
Anforderungen erklären, die sich aus Prozessen funktionaler Konversion und der Evolution 
einer neuartigen komplementären Konversion ergeben. Vielmehr lässt sich der Wandel als 
Anpassungsprozess des deutschen Systems der Corporate Governance analysieren. 
Keywords 
Corporate governance, institutional change, capital markets, varieties of capitalism, German 
coordinated market economy, industrial relations. 
Schlagwörter 
Corporate Governance, institutioneller Wandel, Kapitalmärkte, Produktionsregime, koordinierte 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the collapse of state socialism, the focus of debate in the social sciences came to rest 
on differences within the capitalist world between different models of capitalist organisation. 
Just ten years on, the debate has shifted further, and there are now being voiced both 
triumphant claims and fears that one model of capitalism – that of competitive or liberal 
market capitalism – might be displacing all others. The fundamental and long-established 
differences between what has come to be known as organised or co-ordinated market 
economies and competitive or liberal market economies are said to be in the process of 
erosion.  
This new debate has focused on changes in capital markets, corporate financing and their 
implications for corporate governance - institutions widely held to be cornerstones of models 
of capitalism. Corporate governance may be loosely defined as all those rules and 
arrangements structuring the exercise of control over company assets and the pattern of 
interaction between different stakeholders. Financial systems influence the allocation and 
use of capital (in the forms of shares) and shape modes of corporate governance. Forms of 
corporate governance, in turn, structure most other relationships within firms and even in 
society as a whole, as they are inherently connected with a redistribution of power and 
material welfare. In contrast to Deeg (this volume), I therefore view both as key institutions 
which decisively shape the logic of the whole political economy. Hence, there is strong 
concern, particularly but not only on the part of labour, with the consequences of any 
processes of change from the model of ‘co-ordinated’ to that of a ‘liberal market’ economy for 
the redistribution of surplus and control to various stakeholders in the firm.  
Transformation of corporate governance has been most pronounced in coordinated market 
economies, and the impetus for and advocacy of change have come chiefly from the US 
(O’Sullivan 2000). As Germany long has been portrayed as the paradigm case of 
coordinated capitalism  (Hall and Soskice 1999; Deeg 2001), with many built-in institutional 
obstacles to erosion, debate around the German case is of particular interest.  If the hitherto 
very cohesive German system can be shown to be in the process of fundamental change, 
then other continental European business systems also may be vulnerable.   
The processes of change which can be empirically observed have initiated a fresh debate on 
institutional transformation and how it might best be conceptualised. In particular, it is being 
debated whether the changes in corporate governance signal radical system transformation 
and a process of convergence, or whether they can be absorbed into the existing institutions 
of a coordinated market economy by processes of institutional adaptation. Four positions 
may be distinguished in this debate: an argument for system transformation and 
convergence; claims for system persistence, albeit with partial adjustment of the old model; a 
diagnosis positing the emergence of a hybrid model of capitalism or business system. A 
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fourth position, of which there are two variants, argues for the establishment of a new 
complementarity between the system of corporate governance, on the one side, and the 
system of labour representation, on the other. (Deeg (this volume) calls this ‘variable 
complementarity’, defined as ‘subsystems [which] cohere or complement each other in 
different ways under different conditions’ (ibid: 13-14).. Variant A is confident about functional 
conversion (as defined by Thelen 2000) of the system of labour representation, to adjust to 
changes in corporate governance. Variant B posits that new entrants into the system of 
corporate governance – usually institutional investors – will adjust their expectations, to 
become congruent with the established model and its production paradigm.  
This paper seeks to clarify the extent and exact nature of current transformations in the 
German system of corporate governance and political economy, as well as identify sources 
of change. It offers both an in-depth theoretical analysis and empirical substantiation of 
institutional change. To this purpose, it will provide first, a discussion of institutional change 
in general and convergence, in particular and, second, an outline and evaluation of changes 
in the German system of corporate governance, placing them in their broader institutional 
context. Although the empirical investigation thus centres solely on the German case, the 
theoretical treatment of institutional transformation is intended to have a significance beyond 
the single case. 
I shall make the contentious claim that convergence is, indeed, occurring. Convergence has 
been variously defined, and in this paper it means one-sided adaptation of the ‘coordinated 
market economy’ model to that of the ‘liberal market economy’. It is being recognised that 
existing German institutions will mediate the impact of the ‘liberal market economy’ (LME) 
model. Hence convergence will not result in the creation of a German variety of capitalism 
which becomes identical to Anglo-American capitalism in all its features. Nevertheless, the 
transformation of the underlying system logic will lead to fundamental and far-reaching 
changes in all institutional sub-systems.  
My argument is not based on the functionalist assumption that convergence is occurring 
because LMEs have shown themselves to perform in a superior way and that imitation by 
the less efficient is compelling. Nor am I assuming that convergence therefore is inevitable. 
To the contrary, it will be shown that convergence is connected with far-reaching 
consequences which will be highly negative for one important stakeholder – labour.  I shall 
suggest that it is reversible, if there is sufficient political will.  
The Anglo-American system of corporate governance, in turn, is not static and is undergoing 
some significant changes. (See Pendleton and Gospel 2003 on changes in the British 
system and Vitols 2003 on changes in European systems more generally). However, these 
transformations are viewed by this author as adjustments of the existing model, rather than 
systemic changes. Changes have been introduced in a voluntaristic manner to enhance 
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system legitimacy, and no underlying dynamic or driver of change has been identified by 
either set of authors. 
Change in patterns of corporate governance is a highly complex process, going far beyond 
changes in regulation of the capital market and the adoption of new company codes of good 
practice.   A convincing evaluation of the degree and nature of transformation has to go 
beyond this and deal also with their multiple real consequences for various stakeholders at 
the level of the firm.  It has to deal with any fundamental changes in company strategy and 
structure and with the new configuration of intra-firm relations initiated by them.  Such an 
evaluation will be undertaken in this paper. In contrast to the chapter by Deeg (this volume) 
which mainly focuses on developments in the financial system and corporate governance, 
this chapter undertakes a more comprehensive survey, including strategic and structural 
changes within firms, as well as changes in the institutions of labour. Such a tracing of the 
interdependencies between financial system, corporate governance and firm-internal 
transformation makes it difficult to accept Deeg’s claims that ‘financial systems may be more 
“expendable” to CMEs’ and that ‘the financial system is not (or no longer) actually an 
important element of distinction among different regime types’ (Deeg, this volume:  15). 
Evidence for an in-depth assessment will be drawn from my own study of German 
companies in one important industry – chemicals/pharmaceuticals and from a range of 
secondary sources on firms in other industries. (The chemical/pharmaceutical industry is one 
of the most important in terms of its contribution to the German GDP and to R&D activity, and 
it also is a major employer. Although the material substance of change is specific to this 
industry, the general trend indicated by it is applicable also to other sectors). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the theoretical framework adopted. 
Section II.1 presents a brief outline of two models of corporate governance found in the 
literature. In II.2, a more extended conceptualisation of the nature of institutional 
reproduction and change is offered, with a special focus on the notions of institutional logic, 
coherence/complementarity, hybridisation and functional conversion. Section III, the 
empirical core of the paper, first introduces a brief historical sketch of the German model of 
corporate governance up to the mid-1990s to enable an assessment of change. This will be 
followed in section III.2 by an analysis of the changes in formal and informal institutional 
arrangements at the levels of both the financial system and of the firm. It evaluates the 
consequences of change for various corporate stakeholders, as well as their opportunities to 
influence the direction of change or mediate its impact. Section III.3 dwells on persistence of 
institutional arrangements at both levels and any enduring divergence of the German model 
from the Anglo-American one. Section III.4 considers the balance of persistence and change 
and critically examines existing evaluations/explanations of the co-existence of  persistence 
and change. The focus falls on such conceptualisations as functional conversion of 
institutional constellations and the emergence of a new complementarity between different 
institutional spheres, as well as on claims about hybridisation of the German business 
system. In section III.5, it is concluded that the concept of convergence more aptly 
4 — Lane / Institutional Transformation and System Change — I H S 
 
characterises emergent tendencies of change and that we may expect acceleration of the 
transformation process in the coming decades. The Conclusion debates the import of the 
analysis made in part III for the debate on convergence versus divergence, in the context of 
the theoretical understanding of institutional change detailed in section II. Finally, the paper 
draws out the consequences of convergence for the German variety of capitalism and the 
role of labour within it. I conclude by raising the question of whether the process is reversible 
and what actors might want and be able to initiate a reversal. 
II THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
II 1 Approaches to corporate governance 
There are two major approaches to corporate governance. The first approach, current in 
mainstream economics, is only concerned with the relationship between financiers of firms – 
mainly shareholders and banks (principals) - and their agents (managers) and with formal 
and informal rules and procedures structuring it. The key goal of corporate governance here 
is to ensure a maximum return to investors. The development of a market for corporate 
control, through the threat of takeover, both structures the ex ante incentives of managers to 
fulfil this goal, as well as disciplining managers if they are under-performing or diverting too 
large a share of net value to themselves. The second approach, more common outside 
economics, is the stakeholder approach.  This focuses on the entire network of formal and 
informal relations which determines how control is exercised within corporations and how the 
risks and returns are distributed between the various stakeholders. In addition to owners of 
capital and managers, employees are the most prominent. The principle embodied in this 
form of corporate governance is that companies should be required to serve a number of 
groups, rather than treat the interests of shareholders as overriding all others. The interests 
of labour here are foremost, and both their right to an equitable share of surplus and their 
entitlement to industrial participation are emphasised (e.g. Streeck 2001). .  
These two systems of corporate governance then may be mapped onto two different modes 
of exerting control (Mayer 2000). The first is equated with outsider and arms’ length control, 
connected with dispersed share ownership and the prevalence of institutional investors. The 
second notion, dwelling on the whole network of control, occurs when share ownership is 
more concentrated and owners of significant portions of ownership are able to exercise 
insider control. Concentrated holdings may be held by family owners, banks or other non-
financial firms.  
In both types of systems, managerial performance is monitored and poorly performing 
managers are disciplined, but the way in which these two types of control are exercised 
differs decisively between outsider and insider control . In the insider system, control is 
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exercised through board membership and legal rights of appointment and dismissal. It is said 
to be more direct and active, whereas in the outsider system control is indirect and exerted 
through the market for corporate control and the threat of take-over. Whereas the insider 
system is associated with management goals of stability and growth and longer-term returns 
to significant owners, the outsider system implies the goals of liquidity of capital markets and 
of opportunities for short-term maximisation of returns on capital invested.  
This paper starts by adopting the second notion of corporate governance which has been 
prevalent in Germany until the mid-1990s. I then proceed to investigate whether and to what 
degree it is giving way to the first type in current debates on this topic.  
II.2  Analysis of institutional persistence and change. 
Theoretical analyses of varieties of capitalism conducted during the last decade or so have 
differed in the degree to which they have systematically considered institutional change. 
Works published during the 1990s, such as Whitley 1992 and 1999, Lane 1995; 
Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, Berger and Dore 1997, Kitschelt et al 1999,  and even Hall 
and Soskice 2001, have predominantly focused on institutional reproduction or persistence. 
In this, they have been influenced both by the notion of what constitutes system 
transformation and by an emphasis on system coherence (Whitley 1992; Lane 1995) or 
interlocking complementarity of institutional ensembles ( Hall and Soskice 2001).  
For Hall and Soskice (ibid), institutional complementarity is said to exist when the presence 
or absence of one institution affects the efficiency of the other (ibid: 16).  This is seen to 
inhibit radical or fundamental socio-economic change and instead promote institutional 
reproduction.  For sociological institutionalists, in contrast, institutional  complementarity is 
derived from the assumption that there is an institutional logic expressed in concrete 
practices and organisational arrangements which influences what social roles, relationships 
and strategies are conceivable, efficacious and legitimate (Biggart and Guillen 1999: 725). 
Additionally, organising  logics are held to be ‘repositaries of distinctive capabilities  that 
allow firms ….to pursue some activities in the global economy more successfully than others’ 
(Biggart and Guillen 1999). Biggart and Guillen’s sociological institutionalism views 
institutional logics as sense-making constructs and focuses on taken-for granted 
organisational arrangements.  Hall and Soskice 2001, in contrast, committed to a ‘rational 
actor’ institutionalist perspective, are concerned above all with interests, incentive  structures 
and efficiency goals.   Both these approaches, as well as the work of Whitley (1999), 
envisage a system logic, internal coherence/complementarity and system reproduction. 
Hence they have suggested that underlying logics are changed only with great difficulty and 
have therefore implied that only extreme external shocks are able to effect system 
transformation. Although change is not ruled out entirely, ‘within system’ incremental change 
has been theoretically privileged.    
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More recently, in the face of empirically observable, wide-ranging change in core institutional 
arrangements, analysts have begun to question four interconnected assumptions of the 
above approaches: 1. That system change necessarily has to be of the radical big-bang 
nature (Sorge, this volume): 2. that it can be brought about only by external shocks 
(Mahoney 2001; Deeg 2001; Thelen 2000; Deeg, this volume);  3. whether  institutional 
complementarity really is as strong as believed by the earlier approaches, or whether 
discrete institutions may change independently from the rest (Thelen 2000; Lane 2000; 
Becker 2001; Deeg , this volume;  Vitols, 2001; Morgan and Kubo 2002; or 4. whether the 
existing complementarity, appropriate for a particular phase of  economic endeavour, may 
not be changed to achieve a new complementarity, reconciling the interests of different 
stakeholders (Hoepner 2001; Hoepner and Jackson 2001; Streeck 2001; Beyer and Hassel 
2002; Deeg, this volume; Sorge, this volume; and Hancke and Goyer, this volume) .  (Some 
of these authors take multiple positions). 
These writers implicitly or explicitly dwell instead on more evolutionary and cumulative 
change. They place great importance also on the influence of internal actors in bringing 
about radical change. Most important, they do not assume an unchanging system 
coherence. Instead, some posit hybridisation of systems and   identify buffers which prevent 
change in one part of the system, affecting other parts (Morgan and Kubo 2002). Finally, 
complementarity is now is viewed in a more fluid and negotiable manner which envisages 
the evolution of a new alignment of interests (e.g. Beyer and Hassel 2002; Sorge, this 
volume) and which permits the choice of multiple scenarios for action or paths (Hanque and 
Goyer, this volume). Such analyses are mostly undertaken from the perspectives of 
sociology and politics. I  agree with these analysts that transformation can result from 
cumulative change and that a consideration of internal actors’ interests and negotiating 
power is vital when trying to understand the process of change. But this should not lead to 
the assumption that exogenous sources of change are not important – both need to be 
considered in tandem.  
These recent critics have elaborated a much more sophisticated and valid notion of 
institutional change and have significantly advanced our understanding of institutions and 
institutional transformation. But their analyses nevertheless  are not fully satisfactory on 
either theoretical or empirical grounds. They either mistake a temporary phenomenon for the 
final outcome (e.g. Deeg, this volume); or they argue for new alignments of interests, without 
sufficient theoretical justification and/or empirical support for this position (e.g. Beyer and 
Hassel). Last, some (e.g. Hancke and Goyer, this volume) argue for multiple path within one 
institutional sub-system, without distinguishing between variety within a prevailing logic and 
variety beyond such a logic.   
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This paper will further explore some of the assumptions underlying the above arguments 
and, in doing so, adopts an eclectic institutionalist approach which seeks to combine 
economic, sociological and political perspectives. Actors are viewed as being motivated not 
solely by rational considerations of interests and incentives, but also by concerns of 
legitimacy and quest for meaning. Hence, in terms of Deeg’s typology (this volume), sources 
of coherence may be either a logic of appropriateness or a logic of synergy, depending on 
circumstances and the actors’ vantage point from within the business system.  
I concur with recent analysts of change that institutional ensembles may change 
independently from each other. But in contrast to Deeg (this volume), I argue that this does 
not necessarily indicate loose coupling, but merely a time delay in change feeding through 
from one sub-system to another. The resulting opposed logics and lack of coherence can 
prevail only for a transition period.  Instead, I follow Biggart and Guillen 1999; Whitley (1999) 
and Hall and Soskice  (2001) in their claim that there is an inherent strain for system 
coherence or complementarity, based on an underlying institutional logic, which cannot be 
disrupted in the longer run if the system is to retain stability. This logic not only structures 
incentives, but also aids sense-making. It defines interpretative schemes, expectations and 
goals, making some scenarios for action legitimate and others illegitimate.  
Thus institutions are not viewed as totally constraining actors – indeed, the latter have been 
viewed as bringing about institutional transformation. It is being assumed, though, that once 
a system logic has been accepted by multiple key actors it poses certain limits, within which 
action occurs and which cannot be ignored in the longer run without incurring sanctions. 
Otherwise institutions would be unable to provide scenarios for action which make sense for 
and/or are considered legitimate by actors located in different institutional sub-systems. 
Hence this paper does not rue out variety compatible with a dominat logic, nor does it 
excluded deviant action by isolated individuals or groups or deviance of a short-lived nature. 
The paper therefore concludes that loose coupling between key institutional components has 
its limits and that hybridisation – defined by Deeg (this volume: 14) as the coexistence of 
multiple orders or regimes within one overarching national regime - can only be unstable and 
temporary. Actors cannot make strategic decisions based on, for example, a market logic in 
one arena and resort to a more communal logic in another arena of decision-making. If, as 
Deeg (this volume) suggests, different logics are to prevail in different sub-systems a buffer 
has to be erected between them to prevent the seeping out of values, expectations, decision 
rules and problem-solving routines from one sub-system to another. It is difficult to conceive 
how this could be managed in a national economy where both sectors and firms have a high 
degree of inter-dependence. The empirical part of this paper will show that, indeed, such 
interdependence exists.   
Of the various analyses of institutional change reviewed above, that advocating the  
evolution of a new complementarity between institutional sub-systems, aligning interests in a 
different way, is the most persuasive.  But the claims entailed nevertheless are advanced in 
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an ad hoc manner, providing neither sufficient theoretical explication, nor empirical 
substantiation. Instead, it will be argued in this paper that, given both the multiple sources 
and wide range of change, we must expect the adoption of a new path in the longer term. As 
adoption of an entirely new path rarely occurs, convergence to the currently hegemonic 
Anglo-American model is the more likely outcome.  
Two further theoretical questions have to be answered. First, how does one know whether 
institutional innovation, resulting from evolutionary and cumulative change, is within-system 
or bounded change, or whether it has led to the adoption of a new path and a more 
fundamental system change. How does one distinguish one type of change from another? 
System change has occurred when a new logic has replaced the old one, i.e. when it is 
accepted by most influential actors in the political economy. It is being assumed that the 
system of corporate governance, which defines relations of control both between and within 
firms, as well as pinpointing their main stakeholders, is crucial to the definition of the 
institutional logic linking all parts of the system. If the logic in the mode of corporate 
governance has changed from a cooperative network approach to one of greater competition 
between capitals one must expect that cooperation in other institutional constellations, such 
as industrial relations and joint decision-making on issues vital to labour’s interests, becomes 
difficult to sustain. A system logic does not prescribe a narrow path but provides a broad set 
of values and goals which establish certain priorities and set parameters of action. Once a 
logic has become scurely established, however, persistent rejection of these parameters 
draws sanctions.  
Second, how does system change differ from hybridisation? Hybridisation usually implies 
that complementarity  no longer exists and that different parts of the system are dominated 
by different logics. Transformation in one major sub-system is considered compatible with 
stability in another sub-system (Deeg, this volume). Thus, to illustrate, the logic of the liberal 
market economy may be accepted by actors in the capital market and in large listed firms, 
but not by unlisted large companies or by small and medium-sized firms and their banks 
(Deeg 2001 and this volume). Or, alternatively, the new logic may dictate strategy in product 
markets but not in firm-internal systems of co-determination (Hoepner and Jackson 2001).  
To sum up the argument so far, it has been suggested that (actual or imminent) 
transformation of core institutional arrangements of the German political economy has been 
more striking than reproduction and that it is necessary to arrive at a theoretical 
understanding of this momentous process. It has been argued that hybridisation generally is 
an unstable temporary phenomenon. If a cumulative change in a central institution has 
fundamentally changed the logic which governs relations within that system, and if it is 
supported by powerful actors both within firms and the political system, hybridisation is not 
likely to endure. The power and/or legitimacy of internal champions of change will lead to a 
spill-over into other parts of the system, even into those more remote from the stock market. 
Complementarity eventually will be restored. Hybridisation, however, may be more enduring 
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if it is supported by some powerful internal actors and effective buffers between different 
spheres of the economy are erected. (See Morgan and Kubo 2002 on Japan). All this does 
not rule out the existence of multiple scenarios for action within a sub-system, but only the 
presence of solutions, informed by different system logics.  
These theoretical claims will be substantiated in the empirical part of this paper focussing on 
contemporary changes in the system of corporate governance (Parts III.2 to III.4). First 
though a short description of the German system of corporate governance during the post-
war period and up to the middle 1990s will be outlined. This will identify the institutional logic 
and coherence of that system, as well as provide a base line against which more recent 
transformation may be assessed.  
III REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE 
III.1 Historical sketch of the German financial system and form of 
corporate governance. 
Throughout the post-war period, until the mid-1990s, the German financial system and mode 
of corporate governance showed a high degree of stability, distinguishing it, for example, 
from the French system (Morin 2000). It has often been described as being diametrically 
opposed to the system of outsider control, prevalent in Britain (Lane 1992 and 1995; 2000; 
Heinze 2001) and in the US (O’Sullivan 2000). 
Among sources of capital for German firms, retained earnings has been the most significant, 
leaving firms highly autonomous (Deutsche Bundesbank 1997: 37, quoted by Becker, p. 31). 
Bank debt was low, and issuing of shares through listing on the stock market was common 
only among a small proportion of the largest firms. Due to a number of reasons, the stock 
market remained underdeveloped and insignificant both for domestic and foreign investors. 
Hence stock market capitalisation has been low in comparison with Britain, the US and even 
Japan. Thus, during the period of 1982 to 1991, stock market capitalisation stood at only 20 
per cent of GDP, compared with 75 per cent in the UK (Mayer 2000: 1). Ownership in 
German firms has been relatively concentrated, and family ownership is still significant even 
in some very large firms. Cross ownership of non-financial firms has been more pronounced 
and interlocking directorships have been highly developed (Windolf 2002). For all these 
reasons, hostile take-over was almost unknown. Although historically banks have been 
important insiders in German firms, occupying a high proportion of seats on supervisory 
boards, their ownership stakes during recent decades have not been high. Their importance 
as insider controllers has been upheld primarily by their ability to cast proxy votes on behalf 
of the many smaller investors whose shares they administer. Important rights of control have 
been vested in the supervisory board.  It  is independent from the management board, and 
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seats on it are held in varying proportions by representatives of owners and employees. 
Relatively effective employee co-determination has been a distinctive feature of the German 
system of corporate governance.  
Such a system of corporate governance has implications for a wider range of stakeholders.  
Hence top managers in this system are said to be less autonomous than their British 
counterparts (Vitols et al 1997), being more accountable to both large owners, banks, 
employees and even the local community. Decision-making is more consensus-oriented and 
may even be described as more collective.  
There has, however, been a relatively low constraint to deliver very high returns to 
shareholders, and instead stability of the firm, market growth, together with adequate profits, 
have been management goals. Managers usually made their career in a given industry and 
advanced to top positions within the internal labour market. These circumstances have 
enabled managers to pursue strategies, oriented towards longer-term returns, and this 
orientation has shaped the German practice of skill development and the production 
paradigm of diversified quality production.  
Employees possess legally guaranteed rights of control, both through representation on 
works councils and on the supervisory board. The number of seats held by representatives 
of labour on supervisory boards differs according to firm size but can approach parity with 
representatives of capital in the largest firms. (For details on the system of codetermination, 
see Lane 1989). Unions are not formally represented in firms but strongly rely on works 
councils for information and recruitment of new members. Labour representatives have 
exercised their rights to safeguard their skills, their employment security and an equitable 
distribution of surplus between various stakeholders. In practice, the effective use of legal 
rights greatly depends on the local strength of labour which is influenced both by the nature 
of and degree of indispensability of employees’ technical skills and of activists’ social and 
political resources and capabilities (Kaedtler and Sperling 2003). Both works councils and 
board representation have been utilised in a manner which combines co-operation with 
management on many issues with a more oppositional stance on others. Despite some 
variation in the balance between partnership and conflict between firms and industries, the 
German system as a whole has been aptly described as one of Konfliktpartnerschaft 
(conflictual partnership) (Mueller-Jentsch 1993).  
During the 1990s, both the level of union membership and of the number of works councils 
have declined, as a consequence of both increased globalisation and of reunification. The 
pay gap between top managerial staff and other employees has been far less pronounced 
than, for example, in Britain and the USA (Crouch and Streeck 1997). The other side of the 
coin is that financial control of organisational subunits has been relatively lax, financial 
transparency of companies low, and small investors have had no means to safeguard 
adequate returns on their investment.  
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The underlying logic, informing all parts of the German political economy, has been shaped 
by a network type of control. This has aimed for stability and growth, rather than for short-
term high returns on investment. This network has included employees as important 
stakeholders in the firm, entitled to a fair share of surplus and to co-decision-making in areas 
directly affecting their current and future well-being. A logic of co-operation both within 
networks and in individual companies, rather than one of market competition, has prevailed.  
III.2 Recent institutional changes in the German financial system and 
system of corporate governance. 
III.2.1 Sources and promoters of change 
This network system of corporate governance has begun to change during the second half of 
the 1990s, and it is suggested that both exogenous and endogenous sources of change and 
actors need to be considered. The external impetus for change has come from three main 
sources. Although there is considerable interdependence between them, each source of 
change also can be effective in isolation.  Many analyses of changes in the German model of 
capitalism have focused mainly on the transformation of the financial system and of capital 
markets (e.g Heinze 2001; Deeg, this volume) or deny the marked interaction in the 
influence of international capital and goods markets (e.g.Beyer and Hassel 2002: 12). Only a 
consideration of all three sources and a recognition of their mutually reinforcing impact, 
however, is able to capture the full force for change.  
The first source of change has been liberalization of international capital markets and the 
greater readiness of hitherto ‘national’ capital to seek out the most profitable opportunities for 
both accessing and investing capital wherever this may be in the world. This has entailed the 
modernisation of capital markets in continental Europe –particularly in France and Germany - 
and the spread of the Anglo-American model of organising them. Such modernization has 
introduced new market actors  - investment funds - and has established enhanced legitimacy 
for and wide acceptance of their primary goal – improved shareholder value. This, in turn, 
has put pressures on listed firms to restructure their operations in line with fund managers’ 
expectations, particularly to reduce diversity and concentrate on what is considered core 
business.  Failure to de-diversify is sanctioned by the so-called conglomerate discount on 
the share prices of such firms. Greater pressure for enhanced profits and dividends has 
forced managers to turn previously integrated organisational sub-units into independent 
profit centres. Capital market actors thus have introduced the logic of the market into firms 
and have been able to influence their strategic decision-making. 
Intensified competition in product markets has been the second source of change. It has 
made it important to attain sufficient size and market influence to prevail against international 
competitors, and this has exerted pressure for capital concentration, through merger and 
12 — Lane / Institutional Transformation and System Change — I H S 
 
acquisition. This, in turn, sometimes has precipitated listing on stock markets. (An example is 
the pharmaceuticals company Merck KgaA which, although in majority family ownership, 
listed a proportion of its shares in 1996). Competitiveness on international markets also has 
been shaped by product innovation. The much increased speed of innovation and the greatly 
enhanced cost of research and development to achieve it, have created further pressures for 
capital concentration and reliance on the stock market to achieve it.  
A third source of change in corporate governance have been new cultural or ideological 
orientations, shaped by three processes of cultural diffusion. Here the reference is to the 
concept of shareholder value and associated motivations, cognitions and scenarios for 
action. These have been widely propagated by consultancy firms which are often of Anglo-
American origin. They have been absorbed through participation in new programmes of 
management education, particularly the MBA, and, last, during extended spells of direct 
exposure to Anglo-American business environments when managing German subsidiaries in 
these two countries.  
All these external pressures, it will be shown below, have not simply been imposed on 
unwilling financial and non-financial firms. Core and powerful economic actors have begun to 
identify their own interests with those of capital market actors and to actively promote 
internal change. Political actors have given them legislative support and have not stepped in 
to alleviate the consequences of financial liberalization, as evidenced in the recent take-over 
of  Mannesmann by Vodafone. (For details, see Hoepner and Jackson 2001). Furthermore, 
important legislation, fundamentally changing the principle of governance, has been passed 
by the social-democratic/Green government.  
However, political attitudes on what model of capitalism is appropriate and desirable for 
Germany have differed both within parties and between them. Thus, the current and previous 
social democratic /Green coalition governments have been sending out conflicting 
messages. The new Takeover Law, in force since 1 January 2002, permits the target 
management to put into place anti-takeover defences, provided these have either received 
support from 75 per cent of shareholders or have been authorised in advance by the 
supervisory board (Deakin et al 2002). Also opposition to the introduction of a new liberal EU 
directive on takeovers has been opposed by German members of the European parliament, 
leading to its narrow defeat. Last, the SPD/Green led governments, until recently, have 
shown themselves to be very pro-labour on the issue of labour market reform. There is no 
indication as to how these conflicting stances towards organising labour and capital markets 
are to be reconciled.   
Finally, it is evident that multiple exogenous sources of change have exerted a powerful 
influence, accepted by key sets of internal actors. It is, therefore difficult to accept the claim 
made by Deeg (this volume), Becker (2001), and Vitols (2001) that the impact of change can 
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be contained in one section of the economy –  in a few large flagship companies – and not 
seep out to other segments of the economy as well, as argued in this paper.  
III.2.2 Changes in capital markets 
Wide-ranging changes in German capital markets have been effected by both important 
market actors and by government changes in legislation. A long list of changes from the mid 
1990s onwards (for an exhaustive list, see Hoepner 2001) by 1998 had led to the 
modernization of the organisation and regulation of the German stock market and to the 
establishment of a centralised capital market on the US/UK model.  Particularly significant 
steps were: the weakening of the regional decentralization of stock markets and the creation 
of a unified market in Frankfurt, to become the privatised Deutsche Boerse; the creation, in 
1994, of a federal authority for market supervision; the establishment of legal rules and 
conventions, creating greater transparency in firm structures and actions; safeguarding of 
the rights of minority owners; the removal of some hurdles to hostile takeover; and the 
creation of the  initially successful Neuer Markt for smaller, technology-intensive firms, which 
caused a wider diffusion and acceptance of the market principle both among smaller firms 
and small German investors.   
Other government legislation fuelled the expansion and influence of the stock market on 
firms. Among these were the authorisation of stock options as part of managers’ reward 
package, in order to realign incentives; the legalisation of share buy-back; the introduction of 
a semi-voluntary company code to encourage greater transparency and accountability of 
firms to investors. The most far-reaching piece of legislation, however, passed in 2000 and 
implemented in 2002, is the exemption from tax payments of sales of blocks of shares, 
previously tied up in cross holdings. It is expected that this tax reform, encouraging investors’ 
withdrawal from long-term share-holdings in under-performing companies, will unravel the 
German system of cross shareholding.  It thus is likely to dissolve the large block holdings 
and destroy the network character of corporate control. This, in turn, will constrain 
companies to become more reliant on stock markets.  The resulting greater dispersion of 
holdings then will provide investment opportunities for outsiders, thus making firms more 
vulnerable to takeovers. As non-financial firms are the most significant owners of other non-
financial firms this would knock out the basis of the current German system of insider control. 
This will put into question the long-termism that patient capital has permitted, as well as 
undermine the co-operative character of inter-firm and intra-firm relations.  
All these measures also have changed the role of banks, both in capital markets and within 
firms. Banks have begun to recognise that their business in large firms had been diminishing 
(Becker 2001; Deeg 2001) and, simultaneously, that more money could be made in 
investment banking and active asset management. Deutsche Bank has led the way in 
transforming itself and entering investment banking on the Anglo-American model, and 
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several other banks have since followed this move. Banks’ partial disengagement from 
insider control is evident in their reduced representation on company supervisory boards 
(Luetz 2000) and, more dramatically, from a significant surrender of chairmanships. Thus, 
between 1992 and 1999, banks’ share of chairmanships fell from 44 to 23 per cent in the 
largest forty companies (Hoepner 2001). They additionally now have slightly less control over 
proxy votes  (Deeg 2001). The giant insurance company Allianz, although not withdrawing 
from boards to the same degree, has changed its strategy towards more active asset 
management, in the same way as Deutsche Bank (Heinze 2001; Hoepner 2003b: 22) and 
Munich Re, another insurer (O’Sullivan 2003). Together, these developments indicate their 
reduced willingness and capacity for insider monitoring. As Deutsche Bank and Allianz 
between them are the most significant owners of large listed companies , their change of 
strategy cannot but be highly consequential for cross shareholding networks. Many banks 
already put greater emphasis on short- and middle-term increases in share values of the 
companies in their ownership portfolio (Becker 2001: 316). 
III.2.3 Changes within firms 
The number of companies listed on the stock market has increased very slightly as has 
listing on foreign markets, and the proportion of shares owned by foreign institutional 
investors increased from 4 per cent in 1990 to 13 per cent in 1998 (Deeg 2001: 27, footnote 
39;  O’Sullivan 2003). Also the degree of dispersion of share ownership has risen slightly. 
Those companies already quoted undertook a number of changes, significantly affecting 
corporate governance, organisational structures and strategies and the relations with other 
stakeholders. However, the number listed has remained small and of those quoted, only a 
minority – around 10 per cent – significantly changed their ownership structure and became 
exposed to takeover (Heinze 2001). A market for corporate control, it is widely agreed, has 
not yet developed. But the market nevertheless is shaping many managers’ expectations 
and interests, as external monitoring of listed companies has become prevalent. Together, 
these developments have become sufficient to have exerted a significant effect on internal 
strategic decision-making. Many companies not exposed to shareholder pressures have 
adopted elements of the notion of ‘shareholder value’ to legitimate restructuring and a 
greater performance orientation. Even firms still in substantial or total family ownership, such 
as the pharmaceutical companies Merck KgaA  and Boehringer Ingelheim, now work with 
financial indicators and targets, as well as using managerial incentives, normally found only 
in listed and/or widely held companies.  
Hence the influence of the stock market on managerial attitudes, goals and strategies of  
companies has been pervasive, affecting both listed and unlisted internationally oriented 
companies. Although there is little evidence that investment funds are exerting strong direct 
external control over managers, the indirect influence of the stock market, via the movement 
of share prices, has been considerable. The listed companies have responded to external 
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market monitoring in different ways. Some investor stipulations have been widely followed, 
whereas others have been accepted by only selected companies. These responses are 
evident not only in a fairly common greater cultivation of investor relations, the adoption of 
international accounting standards and the issuing of quarterly reports (Beyer and Hassel 
2002). They are  additionally expressed in more fundamental changes of strategy and 
structure, relating to enterprise goals, such as mode of growth, selection of product portfolio, 
incentive structures and system of payment (Becker 2001; Hoepner 2001). Examples from  
one industry will illustrate this, but there exist sufficient research findings on firms in other 
industries (mainly produced by teams working at the Max-Planck-Institute in Cologne) to 
support a conclusion that this a more general trend.  
As firm size is becoming more crucial to survival in global markets, more firms have had to 
dilute owner control and become listed to raise the additional capital needed for expansion 
(e.g. Merck KgaA, Altana and Fresenius) or to swap shares in mergers. Concern with the 
movement of company share price then motivates managers to introduce various strategy 
changes, welcomed and rewarded by capital market actors.  Some or all of the following 
changes in strategy and structure have been implemented by companies in the 
chemical/pharmaceutical industry: introduction of sometimes ambitious targets for growth in 
turnover and profits (most large companies in the industry); changes in organisational 
structure to enable better control of performance by both top managements and capital 
market actors, as well as to facilitate spinning out and/or listing of organisational sub-units 
(Hoechst, Bayer and Fresenius); introduction of share options or equivalent schemes to align 
managerial incentives with those of investors (all major companies in the industry);  
introduction of  reward systems for employees, tied to the company’s or business unit’s 
performance (all large companies in the industry); some reduction of product diversity to 
enhance transparency and a greater shift to the more profitable pharmaceuticals segment 
(executed most consequentially by Hoechst/Aventis and more hesitantly by most of the other 
companies) (Company Annual Reports 2001/02; Becker 2001). All these measures go 
beyond merely signalling to investors and instead have involved concrete and consequential 
organisational and attitudinal transformations. 
Unlisted firms and those still substantially under family control have responded to a lesser 
degree. But they nevertheless have been compelled to make partial adjustments as they 
operate in the same competitive environment as the companies, exposed to stock market 
control. Thus Boehringer Ingelheim, still wholly family-owned, nevertheless has introduced 
changes in organisational structure which force managers to take more responsibility for 
their units’ performance and has introduced ‘shareholder value’ indicators for purposes of 
internal control. Additionally, the company has introduced a functional equivalent to a share 
option scheme, in order to attract and retain high calibre top managers (Becker 2001: 299). 
Merck KgaA,  although over 70 per cent family-owned, has introduced  share options for the 
same reason (ibid: 310). In sum, important aspects of managerial strategies have been 
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decisively shaped by changes in corporate governance, even if there is still resistance on 
some aspects and different firms have adapted at different speeds and to different degrees.  
Managers are not merely responding to new sets of incentives, but many of the younger 
managers, on the basis of US training or experience, have developed different world views 
and use different sense-making constructs from those current in the traditional German 
business system. Many are less committed to the traditional German company culture and 
internal career and have become more akin to their Anglo-American counterparts (Faust et al 
2000). Career patterns of higher managers are becoming more similar to those of their 
Anglo-American counterparts, as evidenced in the dramatic decline in the average time in 
post during the 1990s (Hoepner 2001) – a feature more conducive to adopting a strong 
stance on raising short-term profitability. More entrepreneurially oriented generalist 
managers are now sought by large corporations, and ‘intrapreneurship’ is more prevalent in 
many managers’ world view than the old bureaucratic model (ibid: 272f). Financial and 
business specialists now are more likely to be selected for promotion to management boards 
(Hoepner 2001; Baecker 2001), necessarily causing partial displacement of the traditionally 
strongly entrenched production-oriented  engineers.  (The radical restructuring of Hoechst, 
for example, in line with shareholder demands, was master-minded by just such a financial 
specialist – Juergen Dormann). More generally, the new generation of German top 
managers recognises the importance of financial indicators and targets as bases for strategic 
decision-making, and applying them has  become legitimate practice among many higher 
German managers (Becker 2001: 274). Such practices are regarded as modern 
management approaches, the adoption of which enhances managerial reputation.    
All these changes in strategy, structure and reward systems have impacted on employees 
and on organised labour, i.e. company co-determination systems and industrial relations at 
industry level. Negative repercussions for employee stakeholders have been various. The 
famed German employment security has been eroded in some large ‘shareholder value’ 
companies, such as the former Hoechst, Siemens and Daimler-Chrysler, where massive job 
reduction has occurred. (See also Faust et al 2000, on the greatly increased feeling of 
insecurity, even among managerial employees). Selling off or closing of sub-units and large-
scale job cutting have become more prevalent. ‘Shareholder value’ firms now spend a higher 
share of net value generated on dividends and a lower proportion on labour (Beyer and 
Hassel 2002: 15, reporting on a survey of the 59 largest German companies). They have not 
reduced spending on labour but have cut the level of employment and thus have intensified 
labour for remaining employees (ibid). In ‘shareholder value’ companies, a greater proportion 
of employees’ pay is now variable (Kurdelbusch 2001), creating insecurity, as well as 
undermining labour solidarity. Representation on company-wide works councils and the 
solidarity it affords have been weakened by linking pay more strongly to performance of 
individual company sub-units.  In the words of Rehder (2002), quoted by Deeg, (this 
volume), ‘the constitutional exercise of worker rights within firms is being replaced with 
contractually negotiated rights’. A much increased focus by employees on the profitability 
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and survival of their employing company also has made employee representatives less 
willing to cooperate with unions to achieve wider industry goals (Hoepner 2001: 27). At the 
same time, labour has not been fundamentally opposed to the imposition of shareholder 
value, and it has even seen some of the new developments, such as greater company 
financial transparency, as being very much in employees’ interest (ibid). Hence organised 
labour, particularly at the company level, appears to be coopted into a more neo-liberal 
model.  
The evidence presented above makes it difficult to accept the claim, made by Juergens 
(2000) and endorsed by Deeg (this volume), that ‘the greater number of firms …have 
shunned or only made weak efforts to adopt the share holder approach’. 
III.3 Persistence of the German model 
The story told so far has provided a one-sided picture. Many features of the old system of 
corporate governance persist, and convergence to and divergence from the Anglo-American 
model exist side by side in a complex mixture. An assessment of the degree of persistence 
has to bear in mind, however, that German companies have only achieved financial 
internationalisation since the late 1990s. 
The most glaring example of persistence of the old financial system is that German firms 
have not been rushing to become listed on the main stock market which, in comparative 
perspective, remains strongly undercapitalised. Hence only the large flagship companies, 
and not all of those, are subject to stock market pressure, and family ownership of even very 
large companies persists. However, the number of IPOs, on the Neuer Markt, increased 
dramatically since 1998 (O’Sullivan 2003: 16), indicating a change in psychology among 
managers of younger firms, and foreign listing on the New York stock exchange and on 
Nasdaq also  had risen by 2000 (ibid).  Individual shareholding, although greatly increased, 
remains low by international standards and thus retards the development of a shareholder 
psychology. Recent adverse developments in the capital markets, particularly the collapse of 
the Neuer Markt, have called forth a renewed scepticism about financial markets.   
Among listed companies, ownership concentration, sustained often by cross ownership of 
shares, remains significant. Average size of voting blocks of nearly 50 per cent may be 
opposed to blocks of less than ten per cent for UK companies (Mayer 2000: 2). This 
continues to obstruct the development of an outsider system of control and of a market for 
corporate control. The influence of foreign investment funds – the most insistent claimants 
for shareholder value - has been significant  in only a small proportion of cases – about ten 
per cent of large listed companies. 
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There has been no change in company law, and the system of codetermination is still intact, 
although both works councils and unions have been weakened during the 1990s. Reduced 
cooperation between works councils and unions and a migration of negotiation to the 
company-level, which preceded changes in corporate governance, has obvious implications 
for the use of the strike weapon and the whole system of collective bargaining. Employee 
stakeholders still retain some degree of influence, if not control, within the enterprise. The 
two-tier board, designed for insider control, remains in place. The partnership component of 
the German model of ‘conflictual partnership’, by and large, is still upheld but its conflictual 
element has been weakened.  
In sum, persistence of features of the ‘insider’ or ‘network’ system thus still is impressive, but 
the points clearly have been set for transformation. Processes of capital disentanglement 
had already started before the Eichel Law was passed in 2000 (Hoepner 2003b: 22f.) and 
labour has become a weakened stakeholder. Hence the developments in capital markets 
and firms outlined in section II may be expected to undermine almost all of the hitherto 
persistent features in the coming decades. This expectation is strengthened by the fact that 
many influential economic and political actors are supporting change, and active resistance 
to it does not appear to be strong. It seems increasingly unlikely that the degree of 
persistence indicated above will endure.  
III.4 Balance of change and persistence: hybridisation?  
The discussion under III.2 has shown that the German system of corporate governance has 
experienced  far-reaching change in its underlying logic, indicating significant convergence 
with the Anglo-American system. But, at the same time, it shows stubborn resistance to 
change on some central features of corporate governance. (See discussion in section III.2). 
Most analysts nevertheless agree that the German financial system and form of corporate 
governance have converged to the Anglo-American model, but they stop short of  positing 
convergence for the whole political economy or variety of capitalism. Instead, most analysts 
are suggesting that other institutional configurations are persisting, adjusting or, indeed, that 
shareholders will be adapting their goals to fit in with the logic of a stakeholder economy. 
Hence these scholars either conceptualise current transformations as a process of 
hybridisation (Deeg 2001 and this volume; Vitols 2001; Baecker 2001; Hoepner and Jackson 
2002), as functional conversion of existing institutional complexes (Hoepner and Jackson 
2001; Hancke and Goyer, this volume), or as the elaboration of a new ‘within-system’ 
complementarity (Streeck 2001; Beyer and Hassel 2002; Sorge, this volume). Functional 
conversion, according to Thelen (2000: 105), occurs when exogenous shocks empower new 
actors who harness existing organisational forms in the service of new ends. Establishment 
of a new complementarity, in contrast, envisages that new external actors adapt their goals 
towards existing structures and interests.  
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Diagnoses of hybridisation are based on the belief that the great internal heterogeneity of the 
German economy creates highly diverse contingencies for firms and hence, despite some 
common pressures, precludes convergent development (Deeg 2001 and this volume; Vitols 
2001; Becker 2001). The focus is particularly on diversity in terms of sector, size and type of 
firm, as well as degree of exposure to global pressures. While Deeg (this volume) and 
Becker (2001) offer both a theoretical and an empirical argument in favour of hybridisation, 
Vitols mainly argues in empirical terms. Becker suggests that variability between firms in 
their degree of adherence to ‘shareholder value’ is due to diversity in managerial 
perceptions, cognitive focal points and evaluations of contingent circumstances, regarded as 
at least in part endogenous to the institutions which govern managerial actors’ rationality.  
The second set of arguments outlined above posits that the system of codetermination and 
democratic participation of labour are such centrality to the German production paradigm of 
diversified quality production that  a way will be found to reconcile the logic of the capital 
market with the logic of an employee stakeholder system (Hoepner 2001; Hoepner and 
Jackson 2001; Streeck 2001; Beyer and Hassel 2002). Evoking Thelen’s (2000) concept of 
functional conversion, it is being suggested by Hoepner (2001) and Hoepner and Jackson 
(2001) that institutionalised practices of co-determination have become transformed, in order 
to re-establish complementarity with the system of corporate governance. In the process, 
they have changed from being an institutional structure to negotiate on issues of a  ‘class’ 
type to one mainly supporting the company goal of enhanced efficiency. Streeck (2001) and 
Beyer and Hassel (2002), in contrast, suggest that shareholders will adapt their demands to 
fit in with the requirements of the German system of diversified quality production and thus 
establish a new complementarity.   
How persuasive are the hybridisation claims? The argument about diversity between firms, 
in my view, underestimates the pressure for isomorphic adaptation ( DiMaggio and Powell 
1991) which emanates from the example of the large flagship companies, the business press 
and consultancy firms and overestimates the capacity, in practical terms, of one set of firms 
to insulate themselves against the ‘performance’ culture adopted by another set.. 
Additionally, it wrongly suggests that transformation of the German political economy could 
only occur if all economic actors were to adopt the ‘shareholder value’ model to the same 
degree.  Becker (2001) and Vitols (2001), in support of the first variant of the hybridisation 
thesis, cite the differing product strategies, organisational forms and cultures of large 
companies even in the same industry – chemical/ pharmaceutical.  They contrast what they 
see as the highly divergent paths taken by Hoechst/Aventis, Bayer and BASF.  
A close analysis of recent developments of the three chemical/pharmaceutical giants, 
however, shows that Hoechst was merely the first, in 1996/97, to choose a strategy of de-
diversification and radical organisational and legal restructuring.  Both Bayer and 
Hoechst/Aventis, on Hoepner’s index of shareholder value orientation, are ranked very 
highly, and Bayer even tops  Hoechst/Aventis in the ranking list  .Bayer and BASF, although 
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originally much more wedded to the retention of a diverse product portfolio and a traditional 
integrated organisational structure, have begun to embark on a similar, albeit less radical 
path. Bayer retains chemicals for the time being, but the proportion of pharmaceuticals in the 
portfolio is being systematically increased. In 2002, the company began to restructure itself 
into a holding company, with legally independent subsidiaries – a pattern highly reminiscent 
of the Hoechst model. The push to proceed in this way clearly came from the capital market. 
According to the company’s web site, this new structure gives greater transparency for 
internal resource allocation, for the capital market and for stockholders (Bayer web site, 
13.August 2002).  It may well be a preparation for the planned acquisition of pharmaceutical 
companies, to further increase the focus on this business area, favoured by the capital 
market.  BASF, too, has sought to gain more focus, albeit in a different direction from 
Hoechst. In 2000, it shed its business in pharmaceuticals to concentrate on chemicals. (Its 
subsidiary Knoll, which had the largest part of the pharmaceutical operations, was sold to 
Abbott Laboratories). Thus, the three companies have not adopted identical strategies, but 
all are clearly changing, albeit at different speeds,  in the  direction, rewarded by the stock 
market.  
Most other large German chemical/pharmaceutical companies have been engaged in  
strategic and organisational adjustments oriented towards capital market actors. (See 
section III.2.3). According to Becker (2001), ‘in all enterprises, there occurred during the 
1990s, an upgrading of financial controlling, closely allied to centralisation of strategic 
management and the granting of operational independence to operative units, all allied to the 
use of performance indicators and targets as bases for decision-making (ibid: 273-74).  It is 
only in the area of greater focus on core competences that most German chemical-
pharmaceutical companies have stalled and are holding on to a more diversified product 
portfolio for reasons of risk distribution.  
Nor is diversity as pronounced when we move to other industries or to firms in lower size 
classes. Although the pharmaceutical industry is among the most highly internationalised 
ones there now exists hardly any industry sheltered from competitive pressures in 
international markets for capital and goods and services. The studies by Beyer and Hassel 
2001, Hoepner (2001), Zugehoer (2001) and Hoepner (2003b:21)  well illustrate that the 
shareholder value orientation is prevalent also in other industries. Even industries with a low 
level of internationalization are exposed to pressures from inward investors and, if listed, are 
not immune from takeover.  
Furthermore, competitive pressures affect both large and medium-sized firms, albeit to 
different degrees. In Germany, interactio between large companies and SMEs is particularly 
pronounced, and a buffer insulating one firm segment from the other is difficult to imagine. 
Firms in both size classes have to seek funds to increase their size or to increase investment 
in R&D, in order to stay ahead in the international competitive race. (See Altana’s recent 
listing and its strongly-developed investor orientation as a good example of a medium-sized 
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firm in the pharmaceutical industry adopting the ‘shareholder value’ paradigm.) Nor are 
smaller firms totally exempt from pressures as large firms have to pass on cost pressures to 
their smaller suppliers. The existence, until recently, of the Neuer Markt, too, has familiarised 
smaller firms with market practices and values. Nor are smaller firms necessarily any longer 
shielded by their banks. Commercial banks themselves now are subject to pressures from 
`shareholder value`. Pressures on non-commercial savings banks to become more profit-
oriented in the longer run will  force them, too, to pass these on to their SME clients, 
especially after the imminent  demise, due to an EU directive, of most of  the privileges 
currently still enjoyed by savings banks (Lane and Quack 2000). 
Managers, as suggested by Baecker (2001), do indeed differ in the extent to which they 
acknowledge and accept the new pressures for greater transparency and shareholder value. 
But their perceptions, interests and motivations are increasingly being shaped by the 
ideology of shareholder value, and generational change also is evident. Goals and practices 
associated with ‘shareholder value’, such as monitoring profitability with numerical targets, 
are not seen in ideological terms, but as being part of modern management practice, likely to 
raise reputation. Some managers have embraced the new ideology with alacrity as, for 
example, the chief executives of Hoechst and Daimler-Chrysler, others have done so more 
partially (the CEOs of Bayer and Siemens) or more reluctantly (the previous CEO of Merck) 
when the adverse consequences of non-compliance for stock price became obvious. In 
2000, the Aventis share surpassed that of Bayer in value by nearly 100 per cent although 
Bayer had been, if anything, more profitable than Aventis/Hoechst during most of the 1990s. 
But it was being punished by the socalled conglomerate discount, whereas Hoechst/Aventis 
was rewarded for conforming to all demands of capital market actors (Becker 2001: 137-140, 
145). Merck’s chief executive – a member of one of the owning families - publicly railed 
against stock market actors’ demands and tried to pursue a strategy of maximum stability of 
earnings for the owning families. Merck’s share price, despite good overall performance, 
consequently did poorly. This chief executive has now given way to a more compliant 
professional manager, and the share price has risen accordingly (ibid). The new pressures 
for enhanced performance and more transparent organisation, exerted on managers of large 
listed companies, have to be passed on to both their subordinates and their business 
partners and thus gradually will diffuse throughout the economy. 
The view of Hoepner and Jackson (2001) that ‘shareholder value and co-determination do 
get along fine’ exemplifies their claim that many works councils have undergone functional 
conversion and are now seeing their main function as supporting management goals of 
enhancing efficiency and competitiveness (ibid). Labour, however, is not newly empowered, 
as Thelen’ s (2000) concept stipulates, but, to the contrary, adapts from a position of 
weakness. Hence the claim by Hoepner and Jackson (2001) that the institution of co-
determination is persisting, despite the changed logic of the system of corporate 
governance, does not convince. The goals of co-determination, it is true, therefore are no 
longer in opposition to those of corporate governance, but the reverse relation does not hold. 
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Adherence to the ‘shareholder value’ principle by management means putting investors first, 
and many of the activities undertaken to satisfy investors go counter to employees’ interests, 
as already detailed in section III.2. What persists in many cases is only an institutional shell, 
emptied of the old ideological content which allowed bodies of codetermination to execute 
checks on and provide a counterweight to the power of capital.  The collapse of any real 
chances for co-determination and its substitution with a co-management stance would be 
better described by the term ‘loss of function’, than by the label of ‘functional conversion’. 
Cooperation, in many firms, is no longer balanced by conflict over issues, undermining the 
interest of labour.  This is, however, not to assert that the influence of German labour has 
fallen to the same low level as it has in the US and the UK.  
Furthermore, the system of co-determination and the stakeholder company, which has long 
been entrenched in German political culture, is now longer sacrosanct and has been 
attacked by several different influential constituencies (Callaghan 2003: 8-9). The 
Commission, which drafted the new corporate governance code, is planning to introduce a 
new investor-friendly measure. This would permit companies, with more than half their 
employees overseas, to opt out of being bound by co-determination (Financial Times, 8. 
November 2002: 9). The Head of the influential national industry association, the BDI, is 
known to be another vocal critic. On 18 June 2003, VIP, an association of institutional 
shareholders, joined the fray. 58.3 per cent of shareholders in Lufthansa adopted a motion, 
criticising the vice-chairman of the company’s supervisory board, the leader of the trade 
union Verdi, for supporting a recent, highly damaging strike in the company. A conflict of 
interests by union members of the supervisory board, highlighted by their motion, additionally 
has been identified by J. Schwalbach, a professor of business economics and the chairman 
of a forthcoming conference on the future of co-determination (Financial Times, 20. June, 
2003: 8). In sum, criticism of co-determination from a variety of quarters make it appear likely 
that a fundamental institutional reform now is on the cards.  At the very least, it is quite 
untenable to claim, as does Deeg (this volume: 26), that ‘the system of co-determination in 
Germany seems to have a high level of path dependency on its own as it seems to remain 
robust in the face of far-reaching change in related systems’.   
A stronger argument in favour of the establishment of a new complementarity between 
corporate governance and the institutions of labour has been advanced by Streeck (2001) 
and Beyer and Hassel (2002). Implictly adopting the view of Biggart and Guillen (19991) that 
a certain system logic ‘breeds’ certain capabilities, conducive to cultivation of particular 
market niches, they rightly point to the indispensability to the German production paradigm of 
high levels of human capital development and consensual decision-making.  They further 
strengthen their claims by pointing to empirical evidence that, to date, wage levels have not 
fallen and commitment to a high-skill economy has not noticeably weakened. However, they 
neglect to note that payment for this expensive system of training now is under strain.  
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Beyer and Hassel (2002) further claim that investors have not shown themselves opposed to 
the expensive training system and may recognise that this system enables German firms to 
deliver higher value. They suggest that institutional investors might be willing to forego short-
term profit maximisation in favour of longer-term gains. Beyer and Hassel (2002) thus are 
citing the arguments of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ and refer to the professed willingness 
of some fund managers to support the ‘high road’ to simultaneous gain both for shareholders 
and other stakeholders. But unfortunately, at the time of writing, these professed enlightened 
goals hardly have been put to the test.  
Furthermore, although many managers and policy makers will no doubt wish to preserve the 
venerable paradigm of ‘diversified quality production’, powerful constraints for profit 
maximisation will make this a much more problematic endeavour than is recognised by 
Beyer and Hassel (2002). Their argument attributes more subtle behaviour to investors than 
is possible in an arms’ length market environment where resources usually flow to producers 
who are likely to guarantee the highest returns. Their assumption that patience by stock 
holders will necessarily be rewarded by higher future yields from German producers is 
dubious. There is no evidence that the German production system of diversified quality 
production can deliver such comparatively high returns on investment.  
The various points made above seriously question whether the various theses on 
hybridisation, functional conversion and the development of a new complemenarity between 
the systems of corporate governance and of industrial relations will continue to be useful for 
the analysis of developmental trends in the German variety of capitalism. The third scenario 
cannot be ruled out on theoretical grounds, but the theoretical basis for any new 
complementarity is not specified, and empirical evidence provided for the emergence of a 
critical mass of enlightened  shareholders is quite insufficient.  The next section therefore will 
again pose the case for convergence. To do so, I will identify the underlying pressures which 
will eventually destabilise the hybrid system and/or bring into conflict incompatible interests 
and goals and advance the process of  convergence.  I shall also pinpoint the developments 
already under way which indicate such a progressive trend.  
III.5 Pressures for system convergence 
As acknowledged by Deeg (2001) and O’Sullivan (2003), the changes in the capital market 
now are so well established that they have become irreversible. They have created a new 
logic for corporate governance which will prove compelling in the longer run. This is all the 
more the case because these changes have been accepted and promoted by powerful 
internal actors – German commercial banks and the insurance company Allianz.  The gains 
from the switch to outsider control have amply compensated the large commercial banks for 
the progressive attenuation of insider control, and their interests now are firmly aligned with a 
stock market oriented economy (Becker 2001).  
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Their enduringly powerful position in the German political economy makes it most likely that 
these financial institutions have been instrumental in nudging the last Schroeder government 
towards support for system change. This first became evident in politicians’ reluctance to 
intervene to save Mannesmann from takeover (Heinze 2001). But a more important 
occurrence has been the introduction of the socalled Eichel tax reform, which encourages 
the unravelling of the system of cross shareholding by non-financial companies, and it has 
been passed without much debate. According to Hoepner (2003b), it must have enjoyed the 
tacit support of social-democratic politicians and of some unions. Since WWII, he suggests 
(ibid), the German left has come to view the entanglement of capital as a political threat.  
Accordingly, politicians on the left have adopted more liberal attitudes, preferring competition 
between capitals to the traditional German network form of cross shareholding, with banks 
as powerful network centres.  But to look solely at political motivations does not comprehend 
the full force behind change in the finacial system. O’Sullivan (2003) plausibly attributes 
changes in capital markets to the realisation, by policy-makers, that German firms have been 
lagging in the ‘new economy’, due to the structure of the German capital market, particularly 
the resulting shortage of venture capital.  
The Eichel tax reform only took effect in 2002, and it is too early to precisely gauge its 
longer-term impact. But two considerations make it likely that network dissolution will occur. 
First, such dissolution was already well under way when the Law was enacted, and further 
disentanglement has occurred since then ( Hoepner 2003b: 23; O’Sullivan 2003). Thus, 
between 1996 and 1998 alone, the holdings of non-financial companies had declined from 
37.6 per cent to 30.5 per cent, and these shares seem to have been bought up by foreign 
investors (Deutsche Bundesbank,  Gesamtwirtschaftliche Finanzierungsrechnung, quoted by 
O’Sullivan 2003: 16). Other activities, showing the growth of financial market liberalism, such 
as quotation on foreign stock markets, strong increases in takeover activity and growth in 
individual share ownership, all have been on the rise (ibid: 16f.). Second, it appears highly 
likely that the vast opportunities for gain, entailed by withdrawing under-performing 
ownership stakes for utilisation in more lucrative investments, will be seized by both financial 
and non-financial firms. Indeed, both Deutsche Bank and Allianz already have signalled their 
intention to follow this course of action (Heinze 2001). Such a development would further 
transform the system of corporate governance, leading to de-concentration of capital 
holdings, much increased stock market listing, new openings for foreign investment funds 
and hence to a market for corporate control. This would deal the death knell to the old-
entrenched German system of cross shareholding and the system of insider control it has 
been upholding.  
Pressures for convergence have come not only from capital market actors, but they also 
have been more or less enthusiastically embraced by a significant group of company 
managers. These managers’ interests are better served by a transformation of the German 
model of corporate governance, or, alternatively, they have been socialised into a new 
business culture, either by managing outside Germany or by studying in US universities. The 
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weakening of the institutions of labour, too, are part of a progressive trend. It is due to 
structural transformations in the German economy, such as a move towards sectors 
(services) and firms (small and medium-sized and ‘new economy’ ones) where organisation 
of labour is much more difficult and unions and works councils tend to be less well 
represented.  
This transformation is not in the longer-run interest of labour, as made explicit by the German 
Federation of Unions (DGB) (Callaghan 2003: 16), but in the short run employees have not 
necessarily been averse to the new model as share ownership has been made widely 
available to employees at all levels of the firm.  This might at least partly explain the low 
degree of opposition from labour against the change in corporate governance introduced. 
Additionally, the growing conflict between the goals of company-based industrial relations 
actors and industry-based unions (Hoepner 2001), together with a pronounced weakening of 
organised labour during the last decade or so, also explains wide-spread acquiescence. 
Although German labour is not yet as weak as either its British or US counterparts it seems 
that, in general, organization against marketization is beyond its organising capability. 
Last, pressures for convergence have existed for only a relatively short period of time, 
starting in the mid- to late 1990s. If they have been able to unleash such fundamental 
change in so many areas in this short time span we must expect that many hitherto 
persistent features of the German variety of capitalism will be swept away during the coming 
decade.  
IV CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding theoretical analysis and empirical description of changes in the German 
model of corporate governance since the mid-1990s has considered both the nature and the 
outcomes of change. It has attempted to make evident the complexity of the change process 
and has shown that diffusion of change from one institutional constellation to others has 
occurred with a time delay. This has led to an as yet  lower degree of change in the industrial 
relations/labour relations system than in the financial system and mode of corporate 
governance. This delay may be due to an absence of  powerful ‘drivers of change’ – a role 
assumed by banks in the financial system.  
The paper has studied the conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to diagnose either 
system reproduction or system transformation through convergence.  There has been a 
particular focus on how to conceptualise the role which the notions of institutional logic and 
of institutional coherence or complementarity play in our understanding of change, and the 
discussion also has included the related notions of hybridisation and functional 
conversion/attainment of a new complementarity.  
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I have explored whether the outcome or direction of change in the German case can best be 
conceptualised as persistence of the model of coordinated market capitalism, adapted 
through functional conversion and the achievement of a new complementarity, as 
hybridisation, incorporating elements of both the `coordinated` and `liberal market` economy 
models, or as imminent convergence to the model of ‘liberal market’ capitalism.  It has been 
presumed that the diffusion of a new system logic occurs at different speeds in various sub-
systems and that, therefore, it is not yet equally pervasive in all of them.  
The virtual consensus of previous analyses of the transformations in the German political 
economy has been that, despite much persistence of traditional  ‘coordinated market’ 
features, change in the core area of corporate governance has been fundamental. Change 
has proceeded too far and is supported by too many powerful ‘within system’ actors to be 
reversible. However, in contrast to previous analyses, this paper has concluded that the 
typification of this process of change as either hybridisation, functional conversion and/or the 
establishment of a new complementarity is unhelpful. The new logic of corporate governance 
already is diffusing into other sections of the economy - beyond the DAX 30 firms - and to 
other institutional sub-systems, particularly to labour relations and utilisation and 
development of human resources, and this process of diffusion is bound to become more 
prevalent in coming decades.  In this way, it eventually will lead to convergence with the 
Anglo-American model. Further development in the direction of convergence is not simply 
attributed to external constraints. It is shown to be receiving support from powerful actors 
within the German economy, particularly from large banks and insurance companies and 
from many of the large internationally oriented and listed German companies, but also from 
some government ministers.  
The concern with a system logic has not precluded a strong focus on actors, capable of 
changing this logic. Actors thus have not been viewed as  totally constrained by institutions. 
Only the opposition to the new dominant logic has been ruled out on empirical grounds, 
given that it is well entrenched in the financial system and that there is no strong coalition 
around labour opposing it. 
The paper has not argued that the German variety of capitalism already has converged 
towards the Anglo-American type, particularly in its institutions of labour representation. It 
has merely identified a developmental tendency and predicts an intensification of this 
tendency in the coming decades. Such convergence will not entail the copying of all details 
of the model of liberal market capitalism, but it will involve the embracing of the underlying 
logic of ‘shareholder value’ above all else. The latter then might be implemented in a manner 
more congruent with German institutionalised practices. Such implementation will, however, 
fall short of hybridisation.  
Occurrence of convergence to liberal market capitalism is not merely of theoretical interest. It 
will have far-reaching practical consequences, detrimental to the continued viability of the 
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model of diversified quality production, to employees and to organised labour, as well as 
increasing the level of social inequality in German society.  It is, therefore, important to ask 
whether there are any powerful or influential supporters within Germany of the status quo 
who might be able to erect buffers between the capital market and institutions of labour and 
industrial relations. Here the arguments of  Hoepner (2001) and Beyer and Hassel (2002) 
carry particular weight. They point out that the German production paradigm of diversified 
quality production is indispensable for German international competitiveness and that it is 
premised on cooperative labour relations. The latter involves the continuation of active 
participation by labour in shaping company strategy and adherence to the high-wage/high 
skill model. Sorge (this volume) goes even further and claims that managers, in a more 
competitive environment, will become even more dependent on their highly-skilled and 
trustworthy employees. The question thus becomes whether the proven importance of 
viewing labour as a stakeholder would result in the adoption of a model which can satisfy 
both international investors and labour.   
Hoepner (2001), Beyer and Hassel (2002) and Sorge (this volume) plead for the evolution of 
a new stable system. The former see this resulting from either the functional conversion of 
institutions of co-determination or from the emergence of a new type of enlightened investor, 
with expectations for the longer-term achievement of returns on investment.. I am, however, 
sceptical that either of the two scenarios will be sufficient or likely to restore the old model of 
a coordinated market economy. My pessimism about evolving a new complementarity is 
based on three arguments.  First, it has not been shown what the basis for such a new 
complementarity would be, and what resources labour can utilise to preserve or re-establish 
stability in the sub-system.  If  a cooperative trust-generating inter-firm network and the long-
termism it has encouraged have been greatly weakened by the transformation of corporate 
governance what resources can managers call on to maintain the costly training system and 
the co-operative style in labour relations? None of the above authors has marshalled 
sufficient empirical evidence to provide the necessary answer to this question.  
Second, even if German managers would like to preserve the old system and its values 
there are developments diverting them from this goal. They may either succumb to the 
powerful incentives of the ‘shareholder value’ idea and become seduced by the new 
opportunities for material enrichment they offer, or they will be constrained to implement the 
`shareholder value` concept, even if they do not welcome it. Also following certain courses of 
action, such as drives for greater performance and return to core in the product portfolio, 
increasingly are becoming regarded as sound business practice which both structures 
routines and bestows legitimacy.  
Last, functional conversion of the institutions of co-determination is not likely to save them as 
industrial relations entities, facilitating the exertion of meaningful countervailing powers. 
Although the structures may persist, their rationale will be changed fundamentally. (The fact 
that they are legally secured cannot, as Deeg (this volume) claims, prevent this 
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development. They will no longer be an avenue through which labour may exert a significant 
amount of insider control  - the feature which has long endowed the German variety of 
capitalism with its distinctive character.   
But the future is never as closed as my pessimistic prognosis makes it appear, and events 
may occur to halt or reverse the convergence process. Given the lingering strength of 
cultural values and social institutional embeddedness of the German model, as well as the 
absence of a clear policy direction which endorses the ‘liberal market’ model, there may yet 
emerge a coalition of industrial managers, employees and politicians working for a new as 
yet inchoate compromise solution. Particularly among politicians in both main parties (the 
Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)) there is not yet 
any consensus (Hoepner 2003a), nor a coherent strategy on the structure of economic 
institutions and the future direction of the economy.  Also the blocking by German MEPs of a 
liberal takeover directive has shown that support in Germany for ‘free market’ policies is by 
no means universal or guaranteed. (The inconsistency in German employers’ thinking on 
various aspects of a liberal market is highlighted by Callaghan (2003: 19). This, in theory, 
leaves open the possibility of a restoration of the old model through the building of a coalition 
at the macro level against free-market policies and the erection of protective barriers 
between institutional complexes. At the present time, however, the emergence of such a 
coalition cannot be detected. At the micro level, continually shifting shorter-term alliances 
between investors, managers and labour are more notable (Hoepner 2001: 27).  
Alternatively, the occurrence of powerful external shocks might stall or reverse the 
convergence process, and this might lead to a consolidation of the anti-liberal economic and 
political faction. A chance for a halting or reversal of the convergence process lies in a strong 
and persistent de-legitimation of the Anglo-American system of corporate governance, or in a 
process of its convergence to the model of ‘co-ordinated market economies’. ‘Stock market’ 
capitalism, since the collapse of the high-tech boom and of share prices more generally, is 
no longer as popular as it was during the 1990s. Additionally, the ‘Enron’ syndrome has 
dented the faith in the US system of corporate governance, although the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act already has begun to restore investor confidence.  
What are the chances for such developments occurring? Although some softening at the 
edges of the UK model in particular has been noted (Pendleton and Gospel 2003; Vitols 
2003) a convincing case for convergence towards the model of a ‘co-ordinated market 
economy’ is still outstanding.  Despite wide-spread disillusionment with the ‘shareholder 
value’ maxim, it would be premature to diagnose the demise of the liberal market economy. 
The renewed emergence of a wave of cross-border acquisitions and mergers suggests 
continuing reliance on and importance of the stock market. Thus, in conclusion, one cannot 
rule out a reversal of the process of system convergence in Germany, but at the current time 
there is no solid evidence that such a process is under way.  
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